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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes how The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street 
Journal explained the loss of Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primaries. This thesis 
argues that conservative and liberal media focus on different explanations for Sanders’s loss 
and that through the style of media reporting several important factors in the Bernie Sanders’s 
primary defeat, such as the influence of the invisible primary, were not sufficiently explored. 
Through the media’s “horse race” reporting style, which solely focuses on which candidate is 
ahead and which candidate is lagging behind, no attention was payed to what happened before 
the actual primaries and caucuses began. This thesis states, first, that there were nog significant 
differences in how the analyzed newspapers explained Sanders’s loss, second, that the invisible 
primary was overlooked by the three analyzed media outlets and, third, that the invisible 
primary played a key role in Sanders’s loss. 
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Introduction 
 
“We have shown the entire world that our ideas are not some crazy, wild, utopian fantasies.”1 
           
 
———Bernie Sanders 
 
On July 26, 2016, Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign officially came to an end when he 
stated: “I move that all votes cast by delegates be reflected in the official record, and I move 
that Hillary Clinton be selected as the nominee of the Democratic Party for president of the 
United States.”2 Boos sounded from the crowd as Sanders officially endorsed Hillary Clinton 
as the Democratic nominee for the presidency. Sanders was at first a long-shot for the 
presidency as the media, political experts and the American public all thought Hillary Clinton 
would easily win the nomination. Nevertheless, as his campaign evolved, Sanders became a 
real threat to Hillary Clinton. This was mainly evidenced by his incredibly strong showing in 
the Iowa caucuses where Sanders won 21 delegates as opposed to Clinton’s 23. In the New 
Hampshire primary, he beat Clinton and took the lead in overall delegates with 36 delegates 
compared to Clinton’s 32.3 However, in the end, Clinton turned out to be the stronger nominee 
and would go on to face Donald Trump in the race for the American presidency. 
 When it became clear that Clinton would win the nomination, American media outlets 
started to give their own explanations for Sanders’s loss. Even before this, early warning signs 
                                                 
1 Deirdre Fulton, “‘We Made History’: Watch as Sanders Addresses His 1900 Delegates,” 
Common Dreams, July 25, 2016, accessed March 4, 2018, 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/07/25/we-made-history-watch-sanders-
addresses-his-1900-delegates. 
2 Nolan Mccaskill, “Hillary Clinton Breaks the Glass Ceiling,” Politico, June 26, 2016, accessed 
March 4, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/dnc-kicks-off-roll-call-vote-to-
nominate-clinton-226239. 
3 Wilson Andrews, Kitty Bennett, and Alicia Parlapiano, “2016 Delegate Count and Primary 
Results,” The New York Times, July 5, 2016, accessed June 7, 2016, sec. U.S., 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/elections/primary-calendar-and-
results.html. 
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were also given. Janell Ross of The Washington Post, on March 7, 2016, wrote an article which 
states that Bernie Sanders did not know how to properly handle women. Ross came to this 
conclusion when the Vermont Senator replied with “Excuse me, I’m talking” when Clinton 
interrupted him during a debate.4 Sanders, in short, would need to work on his handling of 
women as “(…) the time where that kind of behavior — even hints of possibly sexist thinking 
— will be ignored or go unnoticed is probably long dead.”5 New York Times columnist Paul 
Krugman gave another warning. On April 8, 2016, Krugman stated that Bernie Sanders’ 
campaign had lost its ethical basis through dishonest claims when he wrote that “(…) in any 
case, the way Mr. Sanders is now campaigning raises serious character and values issues.”6 
Moreover, the campaign, through its idealism, had brought about a sort of self-righteousness. 
In other words, Sanders, according to Krugman, had lost sense of what was real. 7 
 Both these warnings had to do with Sanders’s image, but after the election, these 
warnings became explanations for his loss. Together with his image, other explanations for his 
loss had to with Sanders’s policies, his inability to win the minority vote, his troubles with 
fitting into the Democratic Party, and his campaign tactics. 
  Sanders’s policies and linkage to socialism had always made him an outstanding figure 
in American politics. Sanders’s socialist background was something the media gave great 
attention and Sanders himself did not shy away from it when he called himself a “democratic 
socialist.” Socialism has always had a bad reputation in America. A Gallup poll from 2015 
                                                 
4 Janell Ross, “What Bernie Sanders Still Doesn’t Get about Arguing with Hillary Clinton,” 
Washington Post, March 7, 2016, accessed January 26, 2018, sec. The Fix, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/03/07/what-bernie-sanders-still-
doesnt-get-about-interrupting-hillary-clinton/. 
5 Ross, “What Bernie Sanders Still Doesn’t Get about Arguing with Hillary Clinton.” 
6 Paul Krugman, “Sanders Over the Edge,” The New York Times, April 8, 2016, accessed 
August 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/opinion/sanders-over-the-
edge.html. 
7 Krugman, “Sanders Over the Edge.” 
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shows that Americans are least likely to vote for a socialist as president.8 As predicted by 
Gallup, this could and did hurt Bernie Sanders in his presidential bid, especially when another 
Gallup poll showed that socialist was the word most used to describe Sanders during his 
campaign.9 In addition criticism on his policies, such as an increase in taxes, were also given.10 
On the part of the minority vote, it turned out that Sanders was, as the numbers show, simply 
unable to win over these groups. Noam Scheiber and Giovanni Russonello of The New York 
Times explained that Sanders was not popular enough and that the groups’ longstanding 
affection for the Clinton family were the main reasons for Sanders’s inability to win the 
minority vote. On top of this, African-Americans viewed Clinton more than Sanders as 
someone who would continue the legacy left behind by Barack Obama.11 
Bernie Sanders also had his troubles with the Democratic Party. Sanders and the party were 
most definitely not a match made in heaven. Seeing that Sanders came in as an outsider, it is 
very likely that this impacted his chances in the presidential primaries. Before his campaign 
began, Sanders made it emphatically known, on more than one occasion, that he was not a 
Democrat.12 Sanders’s policies also play a role in this. His policies do not blend well with the 
                                                 
8 Justin McCarthy, “In U.S., Socialist Presidential Candidates Least Appealing,” Gallup, June 
22, 2015, accessed May 24, 2017, http://news.gallup.com/poll/183713/socialist-
presidential-candidates-least-appealing.aspx. 
9 Frank Newport and Saad, Lydia, “‘Dishonest’ and ‘Socialist’ Lead U.S. Reactions to Dems,” 
Gallup, February 23, 2016, accessed May 24, 2017, 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/189524/dishonest-socialist-lead-reactions-dems.aspx. 
10 Kelsey Snell, “Sanders Tax Plan Would Raise $15.3 Trillion to Fund New Spending,” 
Washington Post, March 4, 2016, accessed May 25, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/03/04/sanders-tax-plan-
would-raise-15-3-trillion-to-fund-new-spending/. 
11 Noam Scheiber and Giovanni Russonello, “Why Clinton Is Ahead Of Sanders With Blacks,” 
The New York Times, March 22, 2016, sec. B, https://global-factiva-
com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=1523010602680084176914488
69811.  
12 Peter Nicholas, “Bernie Sanders: ‘I Am a Democrat Now,’” WSJ (blog), November 8, 2015, 
accessed May 26, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/11/08/bernie-sanders-i-am-
a-democrat-now/. 
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traditional policies of the Democrats. Historically, Sanders has been more on the left than the 
Democratic Party. An example of this is taxation. Bernie Sander called for some of the biggest 
increases in taxes. This was one of the policies the Democratic Party, traditionally, does not 
support. Obama, during his presidency, cut taxes for the lower and middle classes while making 
the wealthy pay more. Sanders proposed a 15.3 trillion-dollar tax increase which would raise 
the rates of everyone, including the middle class.13 
Aside from this, Bernie Sanders’s personal relationship with the Democratic Party has not 
always been friendly. In the late 1980s, Sanders stated that Democrats and Republicans were 
one party in reality; the party of the ruling class. On another occasion in The New York Times 
he described the parties as “tweedle-dee” and “tweedle-dum” as both adhered to what Sanders 
called an “ideology of greed and vulgarity.”14 This all led to the majority of the superdelegates 
at the convention supporting Clinton instead of Sanders as, according to Paul Starr of The 
Atlantic, “A Sanders nomination would be their [Republican Party] opportunity to capture 
decisive control of all branches of the federal government from a divided and weakened 
Democratic Party.”15 Moreover, Sanders would form a threat to the unity of the party and as 
Starr concluded, “(…) the costs of purity can be heavy indeed.”16 
Ari Berman concluded the same in this 2012 book Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild 
the Democratic Party and Reshape American Politics. In the book, Berman states that, 
following the 2008 presidential elections, the Democratic Party was divided. There was a divide 
between the more traditional Democrats and the newer conservative Democrats who came over 
from the Republican Party. This made policymaking increasingly harder as the conservative 
                                                 
13 Snell, “Sanders Tax Plan Would Raise $15.3 Trillion to Fund New Spending.” 
14 Paul Starr, “Bernie Sanders’s Problem With Democrats,” The Atlantic, February 8, 2016, 
accessed May 27, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/sanderss-
party-problem/460293/. 
15 Starr, “Bernie Sanders’s Problem With Democrats.” 
16 Ibidem. 
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Democrats voted against several White House proposals, which in turn led to disappointment 
amongst Democratic voters. In the end, the party was split on several important questions as 
the traditional Democrats supported Obama’s proposals while the conservative Democrats 
opposed his proposals.17 
Another split in 2016 was something Democratic Party leaders tried to prevent at all costs. 
Sanders with his, at best, troublesome past with Democrats was clearly not the candidate the 
party leaders saw as the one to unite the party. After all, the presidential candidate is the face 
of the party and the main representative of the party. As party leaders simply care about winning 
the elections, and not only the one for president, it becomes clear why they overwhelmingly 
chose Clinton to represent the Party. A strong candidate who represents unity would not only 
stand a better of being elected but would also make it easier for other Democrats to be elected 
to the Senate or the House of Representatives.18 
All these issues of conflicting policies, previous conflicts and electability came to fruition 
when WikiLeaks released the emails of Democratic National Convention staffers. These emails 
have shown that the Democratic National Convention was far from neutral during the 2016 
presidential primaries. Emails written by prominent Democratic National Convention staffers 
such as chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz show that the Democratic National 
Convention tried to build a negative narrative around Sanders’s campaign while other emails 
show how Democratic National Convention staffer saw Sanders as a nuisance.19 Sanders and 
the Democratic Party clearly did not match. 
                                                 
17 Ari Berman, Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild the Democratic Party and Reshape 
American Politics (New York: Picador, 2012), 307. 
18 Jamelle Bouie, “The Indispensable Hillary Clinton,” Slate, April 12, 2015, accessed March 4, 
2018, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/04/hillary_clinton_s_presid
ential_campaign_is_vital_for_the_future_of_the_democratic.html. 
19 Theodore Schleifer and Eugene Scott, “What Was in the DNC Email Leak?,” CNN, July 25, 
2016, accessed March 6, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/24/politics/dnc-email-leak-
wikileaks/index.html. 
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As is thus clear, the media gave plenty of explanations for Sanders’s loss, but what 
explanations were emphasized? And what media outlet emphasized which explanation? In this 
thesis, I want to explore which causes the media emphasized and whether their explanations 
sufficiently took into account the importance of “the invisible primary,” as this aspect is easily 
overlooked in the “horse race” reporting style which only focuses on the race at hand and the 
candidates but does not look to the past for context. 20  
Especially this last part is of importance as this thesis will state how the media did not give 
the invisible primary the attention it deserved. The invisible primary, also known as the pre-
primary, was a term first coined by Arthur T. Hadley and it described the period that begins 
sometime between the last election and the start of the next round of primaries. This is the time 
where the possible candidates check whether they stand a chance to win the presidency and 
collect as much money as they can.21 In this period, “(…) name recognition, money raised, 
party insider support and a host of “serious” accomplishments (…) measured success.”22 The 
fact that Bernie Sanders announced his candidacy a considerable time later than Clinton and 
the others will have impacted his chances of gathering money, and as is well known, money is 
one of the most important factors in the run for the presidency. This is precisely where Clinton 
had her biggest advantage over Sanders. 
Sanders also lost the race for media attention during the invisible primary. However, 
interesting to note here was that, according to research performed by the Shorenstein Center on 
Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University, Bernie Sanders had the most favorable 
                                                 
20 Kenneth F. Warren, Encyclopedia of U.S. campaigns, elections, and electoral behavior: A-
M, Volume 1 (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008), 307. 
21 Kenny J. Whitby, Strategic Decision-making in Presidential Nominations: When and Why 
Party Elites Decide to Support a Candidate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2014), 54. 
22 Adam H. Johnson, “Bernie Sanders Had to Overcome Media Consensus Around Hillary 
Clinton,” The New York Times, March 14, 2016, accessed April 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/14/has-bernie-sanders-been-
underestimated/bernie-sanders-had-to-overcome-media-consensus-around-hillary-clinton. 
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media attention of all candidates.23 This did not help him out much though, since the amount of 
media attention he did receive was drastically lower than that of Clinton. Sanders, therefore, 
remained mostly obscure during the invisible primary. In the end, Clinton got the most media 
attention and gathered the most money and, thus, clearly won the invisible primary This had 
consequences for Sanders’s eventual campaign as the invisible primary “(…) created an 
incumbency bias based largely on criteria the Sanders campaign was expressly running against: 
money and establishment politics.”24 Sanders had to gather vast sums of money and could not 
do it in the same manner Clinton did by accepting massive donations from Wall Street and other 
big companies. After all, this was precisely what he ran against. There was also talk of an 
overemphasis on Clinton’s early successes in gathering money and Superdelegates by the media 
as political analysts called her campaign a “steamroller” or a “juggernaut” in as early as May 
2015. Because the media emphasized Clinton’s successes in gathering money and 
superdelegates, it seemed as though Clinton had already won the Democratic presidential 
nomination.25 
The style of media reporting also played an important role during the primaries. The media’s 
main focus, with regards to their reporting on the 2016 primaries, was on the so-called “horse 
race” between Clinton and Sanders. This means that the media reported on the primaries as a 
race between Clinton and Sanders and only focused on who was ahead and who was falling 
                                                 
23 Nik DeCosta-Klipa, “This Harvard study both confirms and refutes Bernie Sanders’s 
complaints about the media,” Boston.com, June 14, 2016, accessed February 24, 2018, 
https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2016/06/14/harvard-study-confirms-refutes-bernie-
sanderss-complaints-media.  
24 Adam Johnson, “How the Media Totally Botched the 2016 Primary Coverage,” Alternet, 
March 26, 2016, accessed February 24, 2018, http://www.alternet.org/media/how-media-
totally-botched-2016-primary-coverage.  
25 David Byler, “Hillary Clinton’s Grip on the ‘Invisible Primary,’” RealClearPolitics, May 27, 
2015, accessed March 5, 2018, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/05/27/hillary_clintons_grip_on_the_invisibl
e_primary.html. 
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back. As will be shown, the “horse race” reporting did influence what explanations the media 
gave for Sanders’s loss. 
This will be the focus of this thesis. I will argue that conservative and liberal media focus 
on different explanations for Sanders’s loss and that through the style of media reporting several 
important factors in the Vermont senator’s primary defeat, such as the influence of the invisible 
primary, were not sufficiently explained. The media often overlooked these issues, especially 
the invisible primary, in explaining a candidate’s success. Part of the reason for this is that these 
causes are not directly measurable in their effect on the campaign. Nevertheless, they remain 
important parts of the election cycle as they lay the groundwork for an election. 
This thesis uses both primary and secondary sources to support this argument. The primary 
sources will consist of the newspaper articles. The articles will be from three newspapers: The 
New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. These newspapers give a 
broad perspective as they have audiences which range from more liberal to more conservative. 
The New York Times is the most liberal, The Washington Post more in the middle and The Wall 
Street Journal more conservative.  A close reading of these sources will be combined with a 
historical contextualization of the media coverage on the basis of secondary sources. Academic 
studies of the history of the Democratic Party that will provide the necessary background for 
the evaluation of the media’s response to Sanders’s campaign. 
The secondary sources that will be used include, among others, three contributions of 
Thomas E. Patterson. In his research, Patterson analyzed the media coverage of the presidential 
candidates both during the invisible primary and through the actual primaries and caucuses. 
Patterson researched how several different media outlets, including those researched in this 
thesis, portrayed the candidates. In his work, Patterson analyzed both how much coverage each 
candidate received and whether this coverage was positive, neutral or negative in tone. 
Additionally, Patterson researched how much of each candidate’s coverage was focused on 
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issues or on other subjects.26 This thesis will build on his work as it uses Patterson’s analysis as 
a starting block to explore how the media reported on the presidential primaries. 
Ari Berman’s Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild the Democratic Party will also be 
used. Berman adds that, after the 2008 presidential election, Democratic voters lost their trust 
in politics as Obama failed to deliver on his promises as the Democratic Party was divided.27 
This loss of interest and aversion to politicians is important as Sanders ran an insurgent 
campaign against the establishment in the form of Hillary Clinton. This insurgency campaign 
was something the media focused on in describing Sanders and his campaign. 
Two other books, Party of the People: A History of the Democrats by Jules Whitcover and 
The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality by Thomas 
Borstelmann explained the developments of American politics. Whitcover explained how the 
Democratic Party became the party it is today.28 Borstelmann added that the 1970s were a 
critical period of change in America and American politics. The two most important aspects of 
politics were equality and free markets. The Democratic Party would become the party of 
equality which supported free trade, whereas the Republican Party developed into the party of 
free trade which supported equality in certain terms. Both parties were similar but the focus of 
the two parties was different which led to the, now familiar, ideological split between the two 
parties.29 This thesis will use these two books to show how politics have changed and how the 
Democratic Party has developed over the years. 
Aside from these more general political books, much has been written on the 2016 
presidential elections specifically. The main focus of these works was on the race for the 
                                                 
26 Thomas E. Patterson, “Pre-Primary News Coverage of the 2016 Presidential Race: Trump’s 
Rise, Sanders’ Emergence, Clinton’s Struggle,” Faculty Research Working Paper Series (June 
2016): 7-8. 
27 Berman, Herding Donkeys, 318. 
28 Jules Witcover, Party of the People (New York: Random House, 2003), XI. 
29 Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s a New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic 
Inequality, America in the World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 208. 
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presidency between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Previous scholarship specifically 
focusing on the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries is scarce. This is mainly because it is a 
very recent event. Most scholarship that exists focuses on the media coverage of the primaries. 
Research has already been done on the overall reporting of the media on the presidential 
candidates.30 This thesis will do more than this and analyze the differences between not only 
the amount of reporting of the media and whether this was positive or negative. This research 
will also show how different types of media explained the loss of Bernie Sanders. 
This research is important as the media has great influence on the public and more 
specifically on the perceptions and ideas of this public. This also means that the media 
influenced the public’s opinions regarding Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton and played a role 
in framing the 2016 presidential primaries. The results of this thesis will show if there are any 
differences between Liberal and Conservative media outlets with regards to what explanations 
they emphasized. The result of this research will be a balanced overview and analysis of the 
media’s handling of the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries. On top of this, as mentioned 
before, more attention has to be given to the roles the invisible primary and the party 
establishment as they lay the groundwork for every candidate’s campaign. This thesis seeks to 
fill this void in research to the 2016 presidential primaries. 
 
  
                                                 
30 Thomas Patterson’s work on the media coverage of the presidential primaries will be used 
in this thesis as the basis for analyzing the media coverage of the 2016 presidential 
nomination race. 
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Chapter 1: Sanders’s Primary Race and Media reporting 
 
On the 26th of May 2015, Bernie Sanders officially declared his candidacy for the Democratic 
nomination for President of the United States. From this moment on, the media would play an 
important role in his campaign. As an experienced politician, Sanders knew how to handle 
himself in the media. A big difference now was that the amount of media attention would be 
much higher for a long period of time. This, next to the fact that his policies are closest to those 
of the Democrats, explained why he ran as a Democrat as running as an independent would 
give him a much smaller media platform to run on.  Running as a Democrat meant more media 
exposure for Sanders through, for example, televised debates.31 
American media would use many frameworks to describe Sanders during his campaign. 
For example, in the early stages of his campaign, the media portrayed Sanders as a protest 
candidate and as one who did not really stand a chance to win the nomination.32 A broader 
frame that the media used to report on elections is that of the “Horse race.”  Here, the election 
is presented as a race between the candidates and the focus is on who is ahead and who is falling 
behind. This meant that Sanders’s campaign, which focused on income, wealth equality, and 
campaign financing, got less attention than himself.  
Sanders’s media coverage differed radically from that of Clinton. On social media sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram his campaign garnered a lot of attention. Especially 
his younger followers were active on these type of sites, earning the nickname the 
                                                 
31 Ralph Nader, “Ralph Nader: Why Bernie Sanders Was Right to Run as a Democrat,” 
Washington Post, March 25, 2016, accessed April 27, 2017, sec. PostEverything, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/03/25/ralph-nader-why-
bernie-sanders-was-right-to-run-as-a-democrat/. 
32 “Bernie Sanders 2016 Presidential Election Candidate” NBC News, accessed April 22, 2017, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/candidates/bernie-sanders. 
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“Berniebros.”33 Hillary Clinton got more exposure through the traditional media. This can 
partly be explained by looking at campaign financing. Clinton got her money through super 
PACs. Sanders, in contrast to Clinton, never made use of a super PAC and instead gathered 
most of his donations through individual donations. The use of these super PACs allowed 
Clinton to gather significantly more money than Sanders. However, Sanders still managed to 
gather significant amounts of money.34 Even though Sanders gathered significant amounts of 
money, he still had to rely on free media attention much more so than Clinton as she had more 
money to spend on commercials. Exactly these conventional media outlets, especially in the 
early days of his campaign, did not pay much attention to Sanders and his campaign. This 
became clear when WikiLeaks accused The New York Times of minimizing their coverage of 
Sanders during the primaries.35 
This chapter will give an introduction to media reporting during the time of presidential 
elections with a focus on Sanders’s campaign. Additionally, this first chapter will also cover 
Sanders’s overall media coverage during the invisible primary in 2015 and the “real” primary 
in 2016. 
 
1.1 Media Framing of the Primaries 
 
It is a well-known fact that the media has an impact on presidential elections. In the 2016 
primaries, this was no different. The media, to an extent, determined the information that the 
                                                 
33 Robinson Meyer “Here Comes the Berniebro: The Young, Male, and Earnest Bernie 
Sanders Supporters” The Atlantic, October 17, 2015, accessed April 24, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/here-comes-the-berniebro-bernie-
sanders/411070/. 
34 “Bernie Sanders 2016 Presidential Election Candidate” 
35 Michael Sainato, “WikiLeaks: New York Times Propped Up Clinton, Subverted Sanders” 
Observer, October 13, 2016, accessed April 22, 2017, 
http://observer.com/2016/10/wikileaks-new-york-times-propped-up-clinton-subverted-
sanders/. 
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public receives and decided how much attention each of the candidates received. Aside from 
the amount of attention the media gave to the candidates, the media also decided what kind of 
information they would give and, more importantly, how they presented this information. In 
other words, the media framed the information they spread in a certain way. American 
sociologist Todd Gitlin defined media frames as “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, 
and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or 
visual.”36 This framing of the news can, thus, eliminate certain thoughts on the subject and 
weaken other arguments. The media, by doing this, framed the news in a certain way that 
favored one side over the other without showing a particular bias on the subject at hand.37 
Framing is, thus, not the same as bias. Framing differs from bias in two important ways. 
First, framing is much more sophisticated than bias and, therefore, harder to recognize as the 
power of framing comes from the media’s ability to control the debate without the audience 
taking notice of it. Framing, therefore, is more complicated than simply being a proponent or 
opponent of an issue. It is more complicated because it adds emotional responses, a cognitive 
dimension, beliefs, and attitudes towards a subject. Second, framing uses the importance and 
influence of media writing and media presentation to deliver its message. In this way, it defines 
situations and issues to set the terms for a debate. This defining of situations and issues for a 
subject of discussion has consequences for the emotions and sets of values it brings up. An 
example given by communication scholar James W. Tankard Jr. shows this. Tankard gives the 
example of how abortion could be framed in different ways. On the one hand, abortion can be 
framed as the killing of a child but on the other hand, abortion can also be framed as an issue 
                                                 
36 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 
7. 
37 James W. Tankard Jr., “The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing,” in 
Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world, ed. 
Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr, and August E. Grant (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers, 2001), 95. 
 17 
that is primarily concerned with a women’s freedom of choice.38 Both frames called upon 
radically different sets of values and emotions and would lead to different arguments and 
conclusions in the debate.  
A step further than a media frame is a media hegemony. One speaks of a media hegemony 
when a frame is so dominant that people accept it without noticing it or questioning it. This is 
the ultimate goal of both politicians and news outlets as this means that your set of values and 
emotions has been deemed as the rightful one. Additionally, this also means that the debate is 
won as the majority of the people have deemed your frame as the rightful one. 39 
The question remains what provides the news media with a framework to present events. 
According to professor Robert A. Hackett, ideology is this provider.40 In political news, 
reporting ideology plays an especially important role. With the vast ideological differences 
between the two dominant parties in American politics, it is no surprise that framing often 
occurs. According to Hackett, framing is something that can unintentionally occur as it may be 
the result of the “(…) unconscious absorption of assumptions about the social world in which 
the news must be embedded in order to be intelligible to its intended audience.”41 This, to an 
extent, explains the differences between how liberal and conservative media choose to present 
their information. 
In politics, there is a specific frame media outlets use when they are reporting on the 
presidential primaries. This frame is called the “horse race narrative.” Horse race reporting is 
“(…) a narrative-framing device that shapes what’s covered, and how electoral events and 
candidates are interpreted in the news.”42 The term “horse race” refers to the tendency of 
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journalists to write about the primaries as a race between the candidates. This style of media 
reporting dominates contemporary electoral news reporting since the 1912 primaries. In these 
primaries, for the first time, there were significant numbers of delegates elected. As a result, 
multiple candidates had a chance to run in the primaries. This had the consequence that the 
individual candidates, rather than the national party, took an active role in running the primaries. 
Candidates now had to attract media attention in order to stand a chance to win the nomination.43 
“Horse race” reporting got big in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the first elections where the 
media made use of “horse race” reporting was the presidential election of 1976, where 
Democrat Jimmy Carter defeated Republican Gerald Ford.44  
The main aspect of “horse race” reporting is that the candidates are judged in comparison 
to the other candidates, or as author C. Anthony Broh states, “A horse is judged not by its 
absolute speed or skill but in comparison to the speed of other horses, and especially by its wins 
and losses.”45 This focus on the candidates, and the comparison between them, has created five 
main storylines in “horse race” reporting that the media used in the 2016 elections. There was 
the “leading” candidate, the “trailing” candidate, the “gaining ground” candidate, the “losing 
ground” candidate, and the “likely loser” candidate.46 
Each of these storylines had their own unique aspects. The “gaining ground” candidate had 
the most positive storyline. In this storyline, the growing momentum, the rise in the polls and 
the growing crowds this candidate attracts were the main focus. Aside from these positive 
stories, there were also some negative elements to this narrative. These negative elements 
focused mainly on the tactics the candidate used to gain momentum. Opposite to the “gaining 
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ground” candidate, the “likely loser” candidate was the most negative storyline. In this 
storyline, all the weaknesses of the candidate came to the fore and were much more emphasized 
than in any other narrative. This narrative was also called the “as-good-as-over” storyline as the 
media stopped giving attention to this candidate. The “losing ground” narrative was a slightly 
less negative narrative than the “likely loser” storyline. In this narrative, the main focus was on 
the possible reason for the candidate’s fall. The main components here were the decline in the 
candidate’s fortunes, the cause of the decline, and the candidate’s efforts to recover from his 
fall. In this storyline, there were no positive elements. The final two storylines were that of the 
“leading candidate” and the “trailing” candidate. In the Democratic race, Clinton was the 
“leading” candidate in almost all of the polls. This had the effect that news reporting on Clinton, 
for the most part, was negative. Clinton was mainly critiqued for how she took the lead through 
her ties to Wall Street. The “trailing” candidate storyline was again more negative than the 
“gaining ground” narrative and focused more on the reasons why this candidate was trailing.47 
This constant focus on the candidates and their race had grave consequences as media 
outlets started shifting their attention away from in-depth discussions on political issues and 
focused more on the candidates themselves.48 Through this, journalists only highlighted those 
strengths and weaknesses of the candidates that fitted well within this type of writing.  
Additionally, reporters who adopted this strategy of reporting had the tendency to interpret 
everything the candidate was doing as a strategy to win the race. This ranged from the candidate 
giving a speech at a school, which the media would interpret as the candidate trying to win over 
the young voters, to a candidate changing his or her hairstyle to appeal more to older voters. 
Media outlets, thus, solely focused on how a candidate was doing in the elections. In other 
words, who was ahead and who was falling back in the race.49  
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Polls played an important role in “horse race” reporting. Polls, in a way, fed “horse race” 
reporting. This was because polls supplied journalists with the data of who was in the lead and 
who was not. Through the use of polls, it became clear who was doing well and who was not 
doing so well. The one thing the polls did not tell is why this candidate was doing well or why 
the other candidate was losing. This was where the journalists had to explain the poll results. 
Reporters were left free in explaining the why’s; their only constraint was that what they say 
would have to resonate with the polls. However, in the “horse race,” the focus was on the 
candidates and all explanations for why a candidate was in the lead or not would center on what 
he or she was doing.50  Or, as scholar Thomas E. Patterson put it: “If a candidate is lagging in 
the polls, the problem must lie with the candidate’s personality or game plan.”51 
Another advantage of polls was that every aspect of the race was brought in a format that 
showed a development in the race. Approval polls, which measured public support for a 
candidate, were the best example of this. Approval rates had the tendency to shift throughout 
the race and could be placed in a graph as time progressed which showed an overall trend and 
can make for predictions.52 
 
1.2 Sanders’s Horse Race during the invisible primary 
 
As a presidential candidate, Sanders was part of this electoral “horse race.” In terms of the five 
main storylines of the “horse race” framework, Bernie Sanders, during the invisible primary, 
fit that of the “gaining ground” candidate. This is remarkable as, during the early phases of this 
part of the campaign, he was in the column of the “likely loser” candidates. Sanders’s campaign 
followed the path of the candidate who the media ruled out from the start but managed to make 
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a miraculous comeback as time progressed. This switch of storylines led to Sanders having 
more media attention as it made for a good comeback story which is always popular. In turn, 
this increased media attention strengthened Sanders’s comeback. Clinton was in the category 
of the “leading” candidate throughout the invisible primary and this had the effect that her media 
coverage was much more negative than that of Sanders.53 
A series of papers called The Faculty Working Paper Series, written by Thomas E. 
Patterson of the Harvard Kenney School, researched not only the amount of attention that 
Sanders got during the primaries and how much of this attention was positive. In his research, 
Patterson analyzed eight media outlets—CBS, Fox, the Los Angeles Times, NBC, The New York 
Times, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post.54 Interesting to note 
here is that the Democratic race did not garner a whole lot of media attention. This was because 
the Democratic primary was not a race at all in the early stages as Clinton led Sanders by 60 
percentage points at the start of the invisible primary. This changed when Sanders started 
gaining on Clinton. When Sanders had closed the gap to 25 percentage points, the Democratic 
race received a lot more media attention.55 Headlines such as “Bernie Sanders gaining on 
Hillary Clinton in crucial South Carolina” and “Sanders gaining ground on Clinton, in echoes 
of 2008” grazed the covers of newspapers and websites.56  
The early lack of coverage was especially bad for Sanders, as he was the candidate who 
had to come from behind. As stated before, Sanders refused to accept donations from super 
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PACs. This had the consequence that he had less money to spend on commercials and Sanders 
was, therefore, more reliant on the free attention the media gave him. As Sanders’s campaign 
gathered speed and managed to lose the “likely loser” frame, he garnered a lot more media 
attention.  
A positive note for Sanders was that the media attention he did get was more positive 
than that of any other candidate.57 Especially in the early goings of his campaign, the attention 
Sanders received was overwhelmingly positive. This fitted his transition from a “likely loser” 
candidate to a “gaining ground” candidate. An overall analysis of Sanders’s campaign shows 
that his reporting was positive all the way through the invisible primary. The research done by 
Patterson, as shown in figure 1, showed that the tone of Sanders’s coverage  
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Graph 158 
was neutral through April, with a dip in May. From June 2015 through September 2015 
there was a spike in news with a positive tone regarding Sanders. This reached a peak in 
September, indicating that Sanders made the transition to a “gaining ground” candidate during 
this time. After September, there was a harsh decline in positive news reporting regarding 
Sanders. In December, Sanders news reporting hit an all-time low during the invisible primary. 
This was the period where Sanders switched from a “gaining ground” candidate to a “trailing” 
candidate. This storyline was a lot less positive than that of the “gaining ground” candidate. 59   
Interesting to note is that in Sanders’s months of decline, October, November and 
December, the first debates between Sanders and his competitors were held. In these debates, 
the fight was mainly between Clinton and Sanders, with Clinton coming out on top most of the 
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time. Other candidates such as Jim Webb, Martin O’Malley, and Lincoln Chaffee did not play 
a role of significance. In the fight between Clinton and Sanders, either Clinton came out 
victorious or there was a tie. Sanders’s poor performance during the debates is a possible 
explanation for his dropping positive references in the media. 60 
 Another important aspect of the news coverage is what percentage of that news is 
dedicated to issues and what percentage of the reporting on those issues is negative in tone. 
Patterson’s analysis showed that seven percent of the coverage of Sanders was devoted to 
issues. This was the lowest out of all the presidential candidates. There was, however, also a 
positive point for Sanders. Seventeen percent of Sanders’s coverage of the issues was negative. 
This is by far the lowest out of all the candidates, with Ted Cruz coming in second with 32 
percent of his coverage on issues being negative.61 
 The overall conclusion that can be drawn from Sanders’s invisible primary news 
coverage is that he did not garner a whole lot of attention until the very end of this stage of the 
election. The news coverage that he did receive was the most positive of all the candidates, with 
the exception of the month of December 2015 where his news coverage, for the first time, was 
decidedly more negative than positive. This media process laid the groundwork for the “real” 
primaries that started at the beginning of 2016. 
 
1.3 Sanders and the Media during the 2016 Primaries 
 
After Sanders’s stronger than expected performance in the invisible primary season, it was the 
question whether he could continue his strong campaign during the voting season. A nice boost 
for Sanders was that he now had a higher favorability rating than Clinton. A Gallup poll of 
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February 2016 noted that Sanders had a favorable rating of 53, as opposed to that of Clinton 
who scored a 49.62 U.S. adults who identified themselves or leaned towards the Democrats were 
taken up in this Gallup Poll. The negative media attention given to Sanders in December 2015, 
thus, did not impact his popularity among traditionally Democratic voters. However, Sanders 
would still have to prove his worth during the race. 
 The election process is complicated because of the differences in types of caucuses and 
primaries. As a start, there is the difference between a caucus and a primary. Most states choose 
for the primary. The primary closely resembles a general election. During the primary, voters 
cast their vote to determine who will be the presidential candidate. What complicates a primary 
is that it can be open or closed. In open primaries, a voter can cast his or her vote for either 
candidate of either party. In closed primaries, only registered voters who are affiliated with a 
party can cast their vote. Registered Republicans can, thus, only vote for Republicans and 
registered Democrats can only vote for Democratic candidates. Independent voters, voters who 
are not affiliated with any of the parties, cannot cast their vote during these primaries.63 
A caucus is more complicated than a primary where one simply casts a vote. Caucuses 
are more time-consuming as there are discussions about candidates, voters pick convention 
delegates and the attendants discus state party business. The advantage of a caucus is that the 
state party is directly in charge of the process instead of the state and the local government. In 
the 2016 presidential run, both caucuses and primaries were used to divide the delegates 
between the candidates. 64 
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 The influence of early caucus and primary results have garnered a tremendous amount 
of scholarly attention. From 1972 on, changes made by the McGovern-Fraser mandate of 1970 
led to the primaries attracting more media attention. The mandate intended to give more power 
to grassroots party members of the Democratic Party and take power away from the party elites 
in Washington D.C. These changes were made to make the Party more appealing to voters and 
the party had to make changes after losing the election to Richard Nixon and the Republicans 
in 1968. An unintended result of this was a tremendous increase in the amounts of primaries 
and caucuses, also for the Republican Party who followed along the same path.65 
Conventional wisdom holds that the results of the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire 
primary have the most impact on the outcome of the primaries. However, recent scholarship 
has challenged this impact. More recent scholarship states that the invisible primary is more 
important due to the importance of fundraising and organization-building.66 What scholars do 
agree on is that a good showing in Iowa and New Hampshire is important as wins here get more 
media attention than wins in any other state. Moreover, wins in Iowa and New Hampshire also 
attract the necessary money to continue one’s campaign at a high level. It is, however, not true 
that a win in Iowa or New Hampshire guarantees the presidency, or the other way around, that 
a loss in Iowa or New Hampshire means the race is over. But this does not mean that a good 
showing in these two states is not important, on the contrary, an extremely poor showing in 
these states can ruin a presidential run as was the case with Al Gore who all but ignored Iowa 
and New Hampshire in his run for the presidency.67  
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Additionally, research done by Randall E. Adkins, a professor at the University of Nebraska 
at Omaha, and Andrew J. Dowdle, a professor at Fayetteville State University, shows that the 
results of the New Hampshire primary have a bigger effect than those from Iowa on the race. It 
has also become clear in this research that the momentum created through a victory in Iowa or 
New Hampshire only helps those candidates who are not in the lead to dispose of other such 
candidates.68 Additionally, where Adkins and Dowdle state that the Iowa caucuses and New 
Hampshire primary can only boost the chances of those candidates who are not in the lead, 
Hugh Winebrenner and Dennis J. Goldford state that Iowa only holds the power to “break” 
candidates as they claim that, “Although the Iowa caucuses may no longer be able to “make” 
dark-horse presidential candidacies in the present environment, they still “break” them.”69 
The first real test of Sanders’s chances was to be measured in the month of February. In 
this month, there were caucuses in Iowa and Nevada. Additionally, there were primaries in New 
Hampshire and South Carolina to close out the month of February. As Sanders’s performance 
in the early caucuses and primaries was above expectations, it helped his chances of winning 
the nomination. As stated before, Sanders narrowly lost to Clinton in the Iowa caucuses and 
defeated her convincingly in the New Hampshire primary, only to lose the Nevada caucuses 
and South Carolina primary. In the end, this meant that Clinton had a lead of 91 delegates over 
Sanders’s 65 delegates.70 
These results directly affected the media reporting on Sanders. In Sanders’s case, the media 
was overall more positive than negative in describing Sanders following his strong showing in 
the month of February. This is because he performed better than the media expected him to. 
The overall analysis shows that Sanders took up 46 percent of the media coverage concerning 
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the Democratic candidates. Of this 46 percent, 59 percent was positive news. Sanders, thus, 
continued his trend of positive media attention and was again the candidate with the most 
positive news surrounding him.71 It can be concluded that Iowa and New Hampshire helped 
Sanders’s campaign as they have done for other dark-horse presidential candidates as his better-
than-expected result increased his media coverage and it gave him more positive media 
attention. 
After the initial caucuses and primaries of February, the race would pick up. Super Tuesday 
was to be the next big measuring moment for Sanders’s chances at the presidency. On Super 
Tuesday, twelve states held their primary or caucuses.72 This important stage of the race would 
prove to be difficult for Sanders. Not only would he see the gap with Clinton grow to 191 
delegates after Super Tuesday, in the following primaries and caucuses in this middle stage of 
the election this would grow to 201 delegates.73 Despite Sanders’s losses, the news coverage of 
him stayed the same during this period: less media coverage than Clinton, but also more news 
with a positive tone.74 
 The middle stage of the primaries was once again a difficult period for Sanders. Not 
only did he see Clinton’s lead grow, the media also, for the first time during his campaign, was 
more negative than positive in describing Sanders and his campaign. This can mainly be 
attributed to the fact that Sanders now lost his “gaining ground” candidate status and fell back 
to the “likely loser” candidate, while Clinton strengthened her position as the “leading” 
candidate which led to positive media coverage. As indicated before, the “likely loser” storyline 
is a lot more negative than the “gaining ground” narrative. What did remain consistent was 
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Sanders’s lack of media attention. During this middle part of the race, Sanders only acquired 
39 percent of the Democratic candidate news coverage.75 
 The last stage of the 2016 primaries would put the final nail in the coffin for Sanders’s 
campaign. Clinton’s victories in California, New Jersey, South Dakota and New Mexico gave 
her enough delegates to win the Democratic nomination.76  Media coverage on Sanders was, 
once again, more negative than positive and he once again received less media attention. The 
media attention focused on his defeats in the state primaries and caucuses, and his vanishing 
shot at the Democratic nomination. There was, however, positive news reporting on his 
character and issue positions, making him the only candidate to do this throughout the 
campaign.77  
In the end, Sanders’s campaign has walked along the path scholars predicted. His good 
showing in Iowa and New Hampshire did not bring Sanders the nomination. However, Adkins 
and Dowdle were right in their assessment of increased media coverage after a good showing 
in Iowa and New Hampshire. The 2016 primary season for Sanders can be summarized as 
follows: continuing positive media attention, yet still not enough media attention. An overall 
analysis shows that, throughout the 24 weeks of the 2016 primary, Sanders constantly trailed 
Clinton in the percentage of the news coverage. The difference now was that the gap between 
Sanders and Clinton was not as big as it was in 2015. Sanders, however, did get the most media 
attention of all the “trailing candidates,” most likely because he was the only real threat to 
Clinton. The next aspect journalists would focus on was explaining the reasons behind 
Sanders’s loss.  
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Chapter 2: Explaining Sanders’s Loss 
 
Throughout the presidential “horse race”, U.S. media outlets have been explaining why Clinton 
or Sanders was in the lead. The real explanations for Sanders’s loss came when it was clear that 
Hillary Clinton would win the Democratic nomination. As can be expected, the explanations 
for his loss were wide-ranging. There were, of course, also some explanations that all 
newspapers mentioned in their reporting on the primaries. Of importance to note is that the 
newspapers, with a few exceptions, did not write articles that were solely focused on explaining 
Sanders’s loss. Most of the times, articles that document the overall progress of his campaign 
gave explanations for his losses and it is explained why Sanders did not win a certain primary 
or caucus in one or more states. Other explanations came when a journalist reviewed Sanders’s 
campaign and his mistakes or missed opportunities were mentioned. Bigger, reflecting articles 
on his performance in the primaries were few and far in between. 
The newspapers that will be analyzed in this chapter are The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal. There are several reasons why these newspapers 
have been chosen. One of the reasons is their different political leaning. The New York Times 
is the most liberal of the three. Slightly more to the centrist side is The Washington Post and 
The Wall Street Journal is the more conservative newspaper. These newspapers have been 
chosen as, through analyzing these three newspapers, all political leanings in the United States 
are represented. Another reason is that these newspapers are among the most popular and 
biggest newspapers in the United States. 
The reason why not more newspapers will be analyzed is that these three newspapers 
will provide more than enough data to analyze. A total of more 1,000 articles have been written 
about the election in the period that will be analyzed. As the results will show, these three 
newspapers, broadly, give the same explanations the same amount of attention. Adding more 
newspapers to add more data will not change this. 
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Articles from these newspapers have been analyzed in the period of February 1, 2016, 
until August 1, 2016. These dates have been chosen as the first primaries started in February 
and the Democratic National Convention of 2016 was held from July 26 until July 28. 
Furthermore, only newspaper articles have been chosen, articles from the websites of the 
different newspapers have been left out as the articles published in the newspapers are the most 
important ones and proved to be sufficient in analyzing the newspapers. The website 
Factiva.com was used to access the newspapers. The search word ‘Sanders’ was used to filter 
out the articles that did not mention his name. One could argue that articles on Clinton’s success 
that do not mention Sanders’s name are not incorporated in the result, but since there are very 
few articles like this, it does not impact the results.  
What is of importance in this analysis is that only the explanations of the newspapers 
are counted. Newspapers often quoted Bernie Sanders on his explanations on why he lost a 
certain caucus or primary. Sanders, for example, claimed that the Democratic National 
Convention boycotted his campaign far before WikiLeaks released the emails. Even though this 
is an explanation for his loss, the newspapers presented it as speculation and not as an 
explanation for Sanders’s loss and it is, therefore, not weighed as an explanation. Therefore, 
only when the writers of the news article explain Sanders’s loss it is counted in the results. 
This chapter will analyze how the three mentioned newspapers explained the loss of 
Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic presidential primary. In addition, it will compare the 
different explanations the three newspapers gave. As will be shown, Sanders’s struggle to win 
the minority vote and the role of the DNC are emphasized most by all three newspapers. 
 
2.1 Overall analysis 
 
An overall analysis of the newspapers shows that the media presented eight explanations for 
Sanders’s loss. The explanations that the newspapers gave were Sanders’s inability to win the 
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minority vote, Sanders’s disliked policies, Sanders’s poor campaign planning, Sanders’s 
problems with fitting in the Democratic Party, Sanders’s inability to beat Trump in the general 
election, Sanders not winning the women vote, Sanders’s lack of experience, and, finally, older 
Democrats voting for Clinton. As graph 1 shows, two explanations that far outweigh the other 
ones are Sanders’s inability to win the minority vote and his troubles with the Democratic Party 
during the primary season. Next, will follow an in-depth look at the explanations given by the 
three newspapers.  
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2.2 The Minority Vote 
 
In the Democratic primary, the minorities are the most coveted group. As Dahleen Glanton of 
The Chicago Tribune stated on February 15, 2016:  
 
This stage [primaries and caucuses after Iowa and New Hampshire in the South] 
can make or break a campaign because black voters, particularly in the South, 
get to use the power granted to them every four years to lift the future 
presidential nominee to the top of the heap, leaving the others staggering in the 
dust.78 
 
The minority group in this research consists mainly of blacks and Latinos as they are the biggest 
minority groups in the United States. As can be seen in Graph 1, all newspapers show high 
numbers in using the minority vote as an explanation for Sanders’s struggles and eventual loss. 
Sanders especially struggled to get the “black vote.” The reasons the newspapers gave for this 
were wide-ranging. In a New York Times article of March 22nd, Noam Scheiber and Giovanni 
Russonello explained why.79 The main reason Scheiber and Russonello gave for this is the 
economy. African-Americans have experienced better economic trends in recent years, 
compared to white Americans. In recent years, income for blacks, in their 30’s through 50’s, 
has risen faster than whites in this age group. Additionally, minorities find economic growth 
more important than anything else. As Mrs. Clinton’s campaign focused more on economic 
growth, it becomes clear why minorities picked her over Sanders. 
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Another reason, according to the reporters, was that Clinton had history on her side. 
History came in the form of her husband, former president Bill Clinton. The former president 
had built up a respectable reputation with the African-American community during his 
presidency and his wife looked to continue on this path. Aside from this, Hillary Clinton’s 
closeness to then-president Barack Obama also helped her win over the African-American 
community. Obama still is immensely popular among African-Americans and Clinton has 
defended Obama’s policies on the campaign trail, whereas Sanders was more critical of the 
former president. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the perfect example of this. Sanders stated 
that the ACA did not go far enough and proposed a single-payer system. Clinton, on the other 
hand, defended the ACA ruthlessly. As a result, black Americans viewed Clinton “(…) as 
having a more instinctive identification with Obama.''80 
Sanders did try to find a connection with the black community in the United States. As 
Phil Rucker, Robert Costa, and John Wagner of The Wall Street Journal reported on July 6, 
2016, this never really came to fruition. The reporters stated how it was difficult for Sanders to 
form a connection as he comes from a state, Vermont, that is rural and 95% white.81 In short, 
the communities he had to win over, could not be more different than his own community. Gilda 
Cobb-Hunter, an African-American state Senator from South Carolina, summarized Sanders’s 
struggles best: 
 
I saw him speak, and he didn't slow down. He didn't read his audience - body 
language, faces, a certain cadence. No slowing down to receive or acknowledge 
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affirmation or an 'Amen' here or there. He was brusque. He didn't appear to feel 
comfortable - and it showed.82 
 
What Sanders should have done instead, was emphasize his own history with civil rights. This 
would have made for some common ground between Sanders and African-Americans. But he 
did not do this enough and started too late. A final reason for Sanders’ inability to win the 
minority vote was his low rate of name-recognition among this group. Because of this, Sanders 
could not catch on to Clinton’s early lead and failed to win over this group of voters as they 
simply did not know who he was and what he stood for. 83 
 
2.3 Party Troubles 
 
The category party troubles led the way in explaining Sanders’s loss in all three newspapers. 
This category is made up of three subcategories as they all have to do with the Democratic 
Party’s negative impact on Sanders’s campaign. As Graph 2 shows, these three subcategories 
are the role superdelegates played during the election, the negative role the Democratic National 
Convention had during the presidential primaries and, finally, the role closed primaries played 
during the nomination process.  
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Graph 3 
 
 
The first problem for Sanders with the Democratic Party were the superdelegates. 
Interesting to note is that The New York Times gave this explanation considerably less attention 
than both The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal did. The two articles from The 
New York Times that mentioned the role superdelegates played were titled “How Delegate Rules 
Explain Your Political Party” and “Clinton Reaches Historic Mark, A.P. Says.” The former 
described how Clinton had a major lead among the superdelegates which gave her a sense of 
invincibility and how, should there have been a tie in pledged delegates, the superdelegates 
would have highly likely given Clinton the final boost towards reaching the Democratic 
nomination.84 The latter described how the superdelegates gave Clinton enough total delegates 
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to win the nomination.85 Articles from The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post 
followed this line of reporting but simply mentioned it significantly more than The New York 
Times. 
The newspapers also explained why these superdelegates chose to endorse Clinton. A 
May 5, 2016, Washington Post article by Ed O’Keefe and John Wagner titled “Sanders faces 
tough sell in getting superdelegates to switch” stated that the superdelegates had supported who 
they thought would win the election. As the primary season progressed and Clinton had a lead 
in pledged delegates, more and more superdelegates pledged their vote for Clinton.86 This made 
it so that Clinton was always in the lead, even after Sanders’s impressive early victories. 
Additionally, many of the superdelegates supported Clinton as she was the establishment 
nominee and because she had personal relations with them.87 
Second, there is the negative role the Democratic National Convention played in the 
Sanders campaign. The role the Democratic National Convention played in the election came 
to light with the release of more than 190,000 emails that were posted on the WikiLeaks 
website. These emails showed how Democratic National Convention staffers tried to undermine 
Sanders’s campaign.88 As Graph 2 shows, counted together, this is the category that the 
newspapers put the most emphasis on. This can, however, have multiple reasons and does not 
simply mean that the newspapers thought this the main reason for Sanders’s loss. 
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As the release of the emails was by far the most surprising and shocking event during 
the end of the primaries, it is not surprising that newspapers gave the most attention to this 
aspect of Sanders’s troubles with the Democratic Party. Mixed in with the Russians being 
responsible for the hack that made the release of the emails possible, it is not surprising that the 
role of the Democratic National Convention was mentioned most in the category party troubles. 
The fact that articles mention the effect of the emails on Sanders’s campaign in articles that put 
the focus on another subject, such as the dangers of Russian hacking actions, shows this.89 
Additionally, an important note is that all three newspapers emphasized the Democratic 
National Convention working against Sanders less as an explanation for his loss than, for 
example, Sanders’s inability to win the minority vote. This is because it is next to impossible 
to judge how big the impact on the Sanders campaign was. Especially since his campaign was 
more successful than anyone predicted.  
Nonetheless, all of the analyzed newspapers agreed that the DNC negatively impacted 
the Sanders campaign. Therefore, it should still be seen as an important factor in Sanders’s loss, 
especially as the leaked emails showed how the Democratic National Convention had always 
wanted Clinton as their nominee for the 2016 presidential race. An article in The Washington 
Post by Dan Balz titled “Leaked emails aside, the DNC has been a long-standing problem” 
stated that the DNC had failed in its role as “(…) The DNC appeared to have its finger on the 
scale for rival Hillary Clinton through the long nominating contest.”90 The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal both reached the same conclusions in separate articles.  
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Finally, there was the negative impact of several closed primaries during the Democratic 
nominating contest. This category got the least mentions in the party troubles category. As 
mentioned before, during closed primaries only registered voters can cast their ballot. As 
Sanders was an Independent before joining the Democratic Party, many of his supporters were 
not registered as a Democrat and could, therefore, not vote for Sanders during the primaries.  
An article of The Washington Post by David Weigel and John Wagner titled “In New York, the 
closed primary works against Sanders” stated how independent voters had bolstered Sanders’s 
successes in states with open primaries, but that the closed primary in New York could mean 
the end of his campaign.91 The reason why these Independent supporters did not switch to the 
Democratic Party was because that many of Sanders’s followers had difficulties with Sanders 
now being part of the Democratic Party and no longer being an Independent. This led them to 
not want to be a registered Democrat. Through this, Sanders lost some of his supporters by 
joining the Democratic Party.  The journalists saw these voters as critical for Sanders to win the 
election. 92 
 
2.4 Policy 
 
The New York Times gave more attention to Sanders’s policies than the other two newspapers. 
An article in The New York Times by Michael Lind titled “Trumpism and Clintonism Are the 
Future” stated how Sanders’s policies did not fit with the issues that are important today. As 
chapter 2.1 explained, the minority group is the most important voting bloc for the Democratic 
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Party as winning this group clears the path to the nomination. According to Lind, social and 
racial issues were most important to this group. Clinton’s campaign focused on these issues, 
whereas Sanders put the most emphasis on political corruption and inequality of wealth. 
Sanders’s policies, thus, did not match with this group of voters.93 
The Washington Post put the least emphasis on his policies. In an article titled “Too 
satisfied to feel the Bern,” Dana Milbank explained why Democrats did not vote on Sanders. 
According to Milbank, Democrats were not as unhappy as Sanders needed them to be. During 
his campaign, Sanders spoke of igniting a political revolution. But, as Milbank stated, the 
Democratic voters were not unhappy with the government and his calling of a political 
revolution did not resonate at all with this groups of Americans. As already shown, Obama 
remained immensely popular among black Democrats, but, as Milbank stated, Obama remained 
popular among all Democrats. This made it difficult for Sanders as he had to be critical of 
Obama to propagate his own policies and agenda but could not be too critical of Obama since 
this would cost him votes. This dilemma led Sanders to lose the votes of many Democrats.94 
In general, much like Milbank described, the newspapers described a misfit between 
Sanders’s policies and the Democratic voters. Clinton’s policies fitted more into the mainstream 
of what Democrats looked for in a president. 
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2.5 Women and older Democrats 
 
Journalists for the analyzed newspapers predicted that women and older Democrats, together 
with the minority vote, would be the firewall for the Clinton campaign. This turned out be true 
as these groups voted convincingly for the former First lady. However, none of the newspapers 
paid much attention to the importance of the female vote. In an article written on June 9, 2016, 
for The New York Times by Alexander Burns titled “Primary Takeaways: Clinton Coalition 
Never Cracked, and Trump Turns to the Fall,” Burns stated that “(…) Mrs. Clinton's coalition 
of women, older voters and nonwhites (…): would have to defeat Sanders’s coalition. Later in 
the same article Burns stated that indeed “Mrs. Clinton's firm base of support repelled Mr. 
Sanders repeatedly (…).”95 Even though the women, older Democrats and minority groups were 
part of the Clinton coalition, the impact of women and older Democrats on the nomination 
process were named far less than the impact of minority groups. Of interest to note also is that 
younger and middle-aged women did not vote as much for Clinton as older women did. For 
older women, one of the reasons they voted for Clinton was because they wanted women to 
succeed and break the final glass ceiling. Younger and middle-aged women did not feel the 
urge to vote for Clinton as they had not encountered these barriers.96 
 The category older Democrats consisted of both men and women. The explanations 
given in this category do not focus on Clinton being a woman as this was not really a reason 
for men to vote on Clinton. The reason why this group of voters chose Clinton had to with 
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tradition. In a way, Sanders crashed the Democratic Party by becoming a Democrat only to 
have a bigger chance to win the presidency. This did not sit well with a lot of the traditional 
Democrats who were looking for a true and proven Democrat to vote for. Clinton, being part of 
the Democratic establishment was therefore seen as the true and proven candidate, while the 
older Democrats viewed Sanders as an intruder in the party.97 All newspapers gave around the 
same number of mentions of older Democrats as an explanation for Clinton’s success and 
Sanders’s struggles 
 
2.6 Fight vs. Trump, a poor campaign strategy and a lack of experience 
 
Making up the back end of the explanations given for Sanders’s loss by the three newspapers 
are the Vermont senator’s lack of experience, his expected inability to beat Donald Trump in 
the general election, and his poor campaign strategy and planning. In all three newspapers, these 
explanations by far received the least mentions. Moreover, The New York Times did not mention 
Sanders’s lack of experience, The Washington Post did mention the fight vs. trump and The 
Wall Street Journal did not mention Sanders’s poor campaign planning.  
On the part of Sanders’s expected inability to beat Donald Trump in the general election, 
it is a very simple reason why Sanders did not get enough votes: Democrats simply did not 
believe that Sanders could win a general election. The title of a The New York Times article 
written by Jason Horowitz is telling for his primary: “Voters Turn to Clinton after Flirting with 
Sanders.” Horwitz further explained why Democrats opted for Clinton: 
 
Seeing Donald J. Trump as an existential threat to American values, many 
Democrats said in interviews that they were ready to eschew the dreamy Sanders 
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revolution for the heavy artillery of Mrs. Clinton and her battle-tested campaign 
machine.98 
 
Because of this, voters would thus have voted for Clinton instead of Sanders.  
On the part of Sanders’s campaign planning, the newspapers agreed that Sanders did 
not manage his campaign correctly, which cost him votes. In a Washington Post article of June 
6, 2016, titled “Doing great too late,” the reporters explained how his campaign planning 
attributed to his loss: 
 
Perhaps the campaign's biggest mistake was not realizing early on that Sanders 
could win. That led to a slow start, both in building the infrastructure needed to 
run a national campaign and in Sanders's own presence among voters who knew 
little about him.99 
 
The New York Times article titled “Early Missteps Seen as a Drag on Sanders Bid” by Patrick 
Healy and Yamiche Alcindor of March 2, 2016, reached the same conclusion in that Sanders 
missed opportunities during his campaign: “But allies and advisers of Mr. Sanders say they 
missed opportunities to run an aggressive political operation in 2015 that would have presented 
more of a challenge to Mrs. Clinton.”100 
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 Sanders’s lack of experience is the final explanation given by the newspapers. Only The 
Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal mention this explanation. Both mentions of the 
newspapers stated that voters did not vote for Sanders because he did not have the experience 
Clinton had. Additionally, a Washington Post article of March 2, 2016, by Paul Schwartzman 
titled “Trump fends off a strong Rubio; Clinton sails” stated how voters who prefer candidates 
with experience were key in Clinton’s primary victory in Virginia.101 
 
2.7 So, why did Sanders lose? 
 
In conclusion, it becomes clear that Sanders’s struggles to win the minority vote and the troubles 
he had with the Democratic Party stand out in the explanations given by the three newspapers. 
Other factors such as his policies and campaign strategy are also mentioned but far less than 
the other two. As stated before, even though the party troubles overall received the most 
mentions, it was not presented as the factor that played the biggest role in Sanders’s loss. The 
analyzed media presented his inability to win the coveted minority vote as the most dominant 
reason for his loss. Seeing that this was a measurable factor, unlike the effect the Democratic 
National Convention had on Sanders’s campaign, the influence of the minority vote on the 
campaign was presented as more influential in Sanders’s loss. Furthermore, the party troubles 
category most likely received a lot of attention because of the DNC email leak which was 
spectacular news to cover. In the “horse race” reporting this is the news American media outlets 
feast on during an election. 
 All this, however, does not mean that the role the Democratic National Convention 
played should be ignored. On the contrary, the possible influence of this organization is far 
reaching. For example, the Democratic Party can determine if a primary is open or closed to 
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non-Democrats.102 As the reporters of the newspapers explained, the closed primaries were a 
reason for Sanders’s struggles in the race for the nomination. For now, the minority will count 
as the biggest and most clear explanation for Sanders’s loss in the primaries, at least until the 
real impact of the Democratic National Convention can be determined. 
 However, a closer look at the explanations given by the newspapers shows that parts of 
these explanations are missing. An example of this is the explanation concerning Sanders’s 
policies and especially how his policies did not match the wants and needs of the traditional 
Democratic voting bloc. Chapter three will show what’s missing in this explanation. 
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Chapter 3: The invisible invisible primary 
 
Chapter one already stated how the invisible primary has a big influence on the eventual primary 
and on who eventually wins the nomination. The before mentioned Arthur T. Hadley described 
the importance of the invisible primary as follows: 
 
The critical battles for the presidency are fought long before the first state 
primaries. Far from being decisive politically, the primaries appear more as a 
ritual encounter, a symbolic show whose results reinforce a victory already 
decided.103 
 
According to Hadley, the winner of the invisible primary will thus be the eventual party 
nominee. This is where Hadley makes too big a statement as the actual primaries and caucuses 
do influence the election. Kenny J. Whitby’s more balanced statement best describes the 
importance of the invisible primary: “(…) winning the invisible primary does give a candidate 
an advantage but it does not guarantee victory.”104 The conclusion that can, thus, be made is 
that the invisible primary is indeed of importance in an election. However, nowhere in the media 
explanations do we find this as a reason for Sanders’s loss. 
This chapter will show how important the invisible primary is and why the media should 
have mentioned it as an explanation for Clinton’s win. It will do this by showing how Clinton 
reached all her goals during the invisible primary. These goals were to win over the party elites, 
gather as much money as possible, get as much media attention as possible and to look good as 
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possible in the polls.105 Another part of this pre-primary process, and of special importance in 
this election cycle, is the development of the Democratic Party. Even though party development 
is not one of the original four factors Arthur T. Hadley mentioned when describing the invisible 
primary, it has to be taken into account in this election cycle as it played a crucial role. As 
chapter two showed, Sanders’s policies not lining up with the wants and needs of the traditional 
Democratic voting bloc, most importantly the black Democrats, played an important role in his 
loss. The analyzed newspapers stated that this was the case because black Democratic voters 
liked Clinton’s policies better than those of Sanders, that Clinton stood closer to Obama and 
that blacks had a longstanding affection for the Clinton family. All of these factors were also 
visible before the actual caucuses and primaries began. Or, in other words, Clinton secured the 
black vote during the invisible primary. 
Missing in the newspapers is an analysis of this party development. Only one article, 
written by Michael Lind for The New York Times, gives a deeper analysis of the black 
Democrats’ affection for Clinton. However, because of the “horse race” reporting style, even 
this deeper analysis does not go deep enough in explaining this occurrence and, therefore, serves 
a good example of the effects of “horse race” reporting.  
This chapter will consist of four parts. The first part will show how the invisible primary 
over the years has grown in importance. The second part will focus on endorsements as and 
will also look at fundraising as both boost one another. The third part will focus on the role of 
the media during the invisible primary and on poll standings since the media uses these polls in 
their assessments and the polled public bases its opinions on information from the media. The 
final part will show exactly why Clinton’s policies played a key role in winning the black vote 
and how her campaign strategy propelled the former first lady to victory long before the 
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primaries and caucuses began. In turn, this part of chapter three will also show the consequences 
of “horse race” reporting. 
  This chapter seeks to give insight into the importance of the invisible primary. It will 
partly do this by giving an in-depth analysis of why Clinton won the invisible primary. This 
showing of a deeper context is by no means meant as a critique on media reporting. It is only 
to show how media reporting differs from in-depth research. Media reporting does not focus on 
providing all of the context that there is as it does not have to do this. It only seeks to explain 
why a candidate is leading the horse race. Moreover, newspapers alter their reporting to the 
reader as the readers of newspapers are not looking for an in-depth review to read every day. 
This chapter simply shows the effects of “horse race” reporting; possible explanations for the 
media not mentioning the role of the invisible primary in their analysis of the 2016 primaries 
will also be given. 
 
3.1 Headstart vs. Momentum 
 
Before we can get into the role the invisible primary played in the 2016 primary, it must first 
be shown why the invisible became so important. In general, there are two theories on how to 
win the primary. The first theory holds that the invisible primary decides who wins the 
nomination and the second theory emphasizes the importance of momentum, in that momentum 
created by winning early primaries and caucuses decides the winner of the primaries.106 
 A key aspect of the momentum theory is media attention. A strong showing in the Iowa 
and New Hampshire caucuses would give the winner a tremendous amount of media attention 
which would create enough momentum to propel this candidate to victory.107 Recent scholars 
have already stated how this theory of momentum does not apply to elections from the 1980s 
                                                 
106 John Aldrich, “The Invisible Primary and Its Effects on Democratic Choice,” PS: Political 
Science &amp; Politics 42, no. 1 (January 2009): 34. 
107 Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides, 303. 
 49 
onward.108 In chapter one, it was shown that research by Hugh Winebrenner and Dennis J. 
Goldford proved that a good showing in Iowa can no longer “make” candidates. 
 The 2016 primaries also prove the point that momentum alone could not propel Sanders 
to victory.  As chapter 1 showed, his better-than-expected performance in Iowa and his win in 
New Hampshire not only gave Sanders more media attention but also more positive media 
attention. However, this increased positive media attention did not have any effect on the 
following primaries and caucuses. In fact, Sanders lost all of the next four rounds.109 There was, 
thus, clearly no evidence of Sanders’s early success creating momentum for his campaign. 
 The reason why momentum no longer plays the more important role in elections is 
precisely because the invisible primary has grown increasingly important over the years. 
According to research done by John Aldrich, there are two main causes for this. First, the prices 
of running a campaign have increased dramatically. 110 Prices of running a campaign increased 
because presidential candidates no longer accepted matching funds. The matching funds system 
was put in place in for the 1976 presidential nomination and meant that candidates who accepted 
the matching funds could spend a maximum of 10 million dollars (adjusted to roughly 37 
million dollars in 2004 due to inflation) during their primary campaign. In 2000, George Bush 
was the first winner of the primary who had refused to accept matching funds. In turn, he spent 
a total of 90 million dollars on his campaign. Al Gore did accept the matching funds and, since 
this meant he had significantly less money to spend, he was no match for Bush once the 
primaries got underway. Candidates in the races hereafter did not want to end like Gore and 
also refused to accept matching funds, John Kerry and Howard Dean being the first to do so in 
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2004.111 This means it has been of increasing importance to collect more and more money in 
the time before the primaries begin, this time is the invisible primary. The second explanation 
for the rising importance of the invisible primary is the so-called frontloading of primaries and 
caucuses. Primaries and caucuses are now happening earlier and follow each other faster. As a 
result, the candidates need more money and they also need this money sooner. This means that 
“(…) early campaign building efforts move from valuable to essentially mandatory.”112 
 
3.2 Endorsements: how the 2016 primary stands out 
 
Articles with titles such as “How to win the presidential nomination” or “Who wins the 
nomination and why” are easy to find, but as it turns out many of these models on why which 
candidate wins the nomination are no longer accurate. Take Wayne P. Steger’s article titled 
“Who Wins Nominations and Why? An Updated Forecast of the Presidential Primary Vote.” 
In this article, Steger states how, during Democratic campaigns, party elites are divided and 
undecided on who to support when the primaries and caucuses begin. Because party elites 
usually wait until after the New-Hampshire primary with their endorsements, Steger states how 
Democratic primaries are thus decided during the real primary season.113 However, Steger also 
claims that elected party officials who do endorse a candidate before the primaries and caucuses 
begin do have a positive effect on this candidate’s chances of winning the nomination. This is 
because, as Steger puts it: “Elite party elected officials thus appear to have a potent effect 
signaling the partisan electorate as to which candidates should be supported even prior to the 
caucuses and primaries.”114 Another indicator of the importance of the invisible primary is that 
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“party insiders use the invisible primary to coordinate behind a preferred candidate and to 
endow that candidate with the resources and prestige necessary to prevail in the state-by-state 
contests.”115 
 In the 2016 primary this was radically different. As a November 10, 2015, CNN article 
pointed out, by this time already 60% of Democratic senators had endorsed Clinton.116 
Moreover, if one looks at the entire run-up to the primary season, it becomes clear how the 2016 
primary stands out from all other Democratic primaries. The popular website 
FiveTheiryEight.com, named after the number of electors in the United States Electoral 
College, focusses on analyzing elections. During the 2016 invisible primary, it kept track of 
endorsements made by U.S. representatives, senators and governors to all the candidates. The 
way this was done was by giving points to the candidates for each endorsement they received. 
An endorsement from a governor was worth ten points, a senator’s endorsement five points and 
one point for the endorsement of a U.S. representative. The distribution of points is based on 
the fact that there are about five times as many representatives as there are senators and roughly 
10 times as many U.S. representatives as there are governors. This leads Clinton, at the end of 
the primaries, to having a total of 523 points to Sanders’s 13. The truly interesting point is that 
Clinton had already amassed 458 points two days before the Iowa Caucuses. 117 This is a clear 
example of how endorsements did in fact occur during the invisible primary. 
To prove that the 2016 invisible primary stands out can be shown by comparing it to 
other invisible primaries. Al Gore’s presidential campaign of 2000 comes closest to that of 
Clinton. Gore would score a total of 448 points, of which 371 came before the Iowa caucuses. 
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The big difference here being that Clinton had already scored 179 points almost a year before 
the Iowa caucuses compared to Gore’s 50.118 However, there really is no other Democratic 
invisible primary campaign that can compare to that of Clinton when it comes to endorsements. 
Now that it is clear how Clinton had a great deal of endorsements from party elites within the 
Democratic Party, the question remains how big of an effect this had on the eventual primaries, 
since the votes of superdelegates alone do not win a presidential primary. 
 The short answer to this question is that early endorsements have a great deal of effect 
on how the primaries and caucuses are decided. Or, as political scientists Marty Cohen, David 
Karol, Hans Noel and John Zaller state in their 2008 book The Party Decides: Presidential 
Nominations Before and After Reform, “The conclusion from the statistical analysis is, as we 
have seen, that early endorsements in the invisible primary are the most important cause of 
candidate success in the state primaries and caucuses.”119 There are several reasons as for why 
this is the case. First, endorsements have an effect on voters. Endorsements serve as suggestions 
to voters who to pick. As Cohen and his colleagues pointed out, this has a genuine effect on 
voter behavior as voters are usually not very interested, not very informed and easily attracted 
to a candidate simply because he or she is doing well, they will likely follow the advice on who 
to vote on.120 Kenny J. Whitby adds to this by stating that “Endorsements can serve as a signal 
or heuristic for voters in those settings [settings where there is not a lot of information on the 
candidates’ policies] and possibly allow them to make informed decisions about candidates and 
issues.”121 
However, a critical side note must be made here. An endorsement is unlikely to change 
the mind of somebody who has already decided to vote for a particular candidate. Endorsements 
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will, therefore, only confirm somebody’s thought towards a candidate and an endorsement can 
only persuade those voters who have not yet made their minds up. But seeing that most voters 
are not headstrong on who to vote for, the endorsements can convince many of these voters. 
 Another reason as for why endorsements are so important is that they generate a lot of 
resources. The most important resource for the candidates is money. And as former Republican 
Senator Mark Hanna put it: “There are two things that are important in politics. The first is 
money, and I can't remember the second.”122 A quick look at the fundraising total of both 
candidates shows that Clinton gathered much more money than Sanders did. As of October 16, 
2015, Clinton had raised 786 million dollars, compared to Sanders’s 237 million dollars.123 A 
clear victory for Clinton. 
But aside from money, endorsements also give candidates other valuable resources such 
as volunteers, and as individuals such as senators or governors may possess some personal 
organization that can help the candidate on the campaign trail their endorsements can also be 
helpful in other ways than donations alone. Among organizations, unions are especially helpful 
to candidates. As Cohen and his colleagues point out, unions mobilize others in their 
communities to vote for the candidate they endorsed, and this helps spread the message.124 A 
1984 study by Ronald B. Rappaport, Walter J. Stone and Alan I. Abramowitz titled “Do 
Endorsements Matter? Group Influences in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses” researched the 
effect of endorsements by unions. The study shows that because Democratic candidate Walter 
Mondale had the support of teachers’ groups, labor unions and women groups, he received a 
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6% advantage at the caucuses.125 Cohen and his colleagues add to this by stating how this 6%, 
even though it does not look like much, put Mondale over the top in, for example, the Virginia 
caucuses.126 
 To conclude, it can be stated that Clinton won both the endorsement and money race 
during the invisible primary. Especially since she managed to win endorsements from party 
elites in such a convincing manner. This gave voters an indication of who to vote for and it gave 
her money as well as other valuable assets. The next part of this chapter will analyze the other 
critical part of the invisible primary: the media attention. Very much like in this part of the 
analysis, there was a clear winner in the fight for media attention. 
 
3.3 The media in control of the invisible primary 
 
The media has great influence on the campaign as they have a big say in how each candidate is 
viewed by the public. This is simply because mainstream media are usually the only source of 
information for voters this early in the invisible primary. The media’s main task is to inform 
the public of which candidate is endorsed by who, which candidate is in the lead of the money 
race and who leads what poll. Or, in other words, inform the public who is in the lead. Media 
outlets evaluate the prospects of all the candidates based on a set of factors. These factors can 
include a candidate’s political experience, fundraising successes, polling results and so on.127 
But what the media does next is far more important: media outlets start narrowing the field of 
contestants. This is necessary for the media to do this as they usually do not have the resources 
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or the space to report on all the campaigns.128 Researchers Michael J. Robinson and Margaret 
A. Sheehan called this narrowing of the field of contestants “journalistic triage” where 
candidates are put in one of three categories “the hopeless,” “the plausible,” and “the likely.”129 
This narrowing of the field has great consequences for the candidates. The main reason 
for this is that everything from fundraising to poll results is interconnected with the media. For 
example, if a candidate raises a lot of money, this will get him or her a lot of media attention 
which in turn will lead to more donations. As the candidates who perform best in, for example, 
poll ratings and fundraising get the most attention, the media pays little attention to the 
candidates that leg behind in fundraising or poll results. The interaction here is that the 
candidates who did receive media attention will likely perform better in the next polls because 
the public knows that they are doing well. Belt and his colleagues characterize the interaction 
between money and media attention: “Candidates who are ignored by the press cannot raise 
money, and candidates who do not raise money are ignored by the press.”130 Raised money can 
be used to buy ads which will increase a candidate’s name recognition as it will give him more 
attention. The public often forget candidates that do not get enough media attention, and 
forgotten candidates stand no chance of winning the nomination. In short, everything is 
interconnected with the media. 
 Another important consequence of the media is that the amount of attention the media 
gives to a candidate has an effect on voters. The amount of attention and the nature of attention 
(positive or negative) given to a candidate have the power to push voters to a certain candidate. 
After all, as professor Miloš Gregor states when commenting on the media reporting in the 2016 
election: “How the media represent each of the candidates has the ability to affect people’s 
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voting decisions and thus the election results.”131 In sum, a good performance with regards to 
the media in the invisible primary is of the highest importance. 
 Chapter one already showed that Clinton received a lot more media attention than 
Sanders did. However, it also became clear that the former first lady received drastically more 
negative media reporting than Sanders did. This begs the question who actually won this part 
of the invisible primary. Was it Clinton because she got more attention even though most of it 
was negative, or was it Sanders because the reporting on him was a lot more positive even 
though he did not receive nearly as much coverage as Clinton? Or, put differently, is the amount 
of coverage in this part of the invisible primary or is the tone of the coverage the key to success? 
 As stated before, the main priority of the candidates during the invisible primary is to 
increase their name recognition. Especially during this part of the campaign, the amount of 
media attention trumps everything else. As Thomas E. Patterson states, “Less coverage of the 
Democratic side worked against Bernie Sanders’s efforts to make inroads on Clinton’s 
support.”132 The Vermont Senator’s struggles in the early part of the invisible primary to receive 
media attention coupled with this poor poll standings, as opposed to Clinton’s good poll 
standings, made it impossible for Sanders to get the attention he so badly needed. One of the 
areas where this hurt him most was with the minorities. As was made painfully clear in chapter 
two, Sanders dramatically lost the minority vote to Clinton. As a March 4, 2016, article written 
by Trymaine Lee of MSBC stated, “Yet, Clinton has dominated the black vote while Sanders 
has netted a huge segment of white and young primary voters. What’s behind the deep divide? 
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Name recognition certainly tops the list.”133 Lee continued by stating that Sanders was a relative 
unknown within the black community when he announced his candidacy.134 Patterson’s 
comments on Sanders receiving less attention explain why he could never recover from this. 
 Now, what remains is to explain why Clinton’s predominantly negative media attention 
did not hurt her as much. Research by Loes Aaldering showed that the effect of negative media 
attention is not as big as the effect of positive media attention: “The negative effect of negative 
images in the media is smaller than the positive effect of positive images. Thus, positive 
descriptions of party leaders in terms of their leadership qualities are more in influential than 
negative descriptions.”135 Another possible explanation is that, even though the reporting on 
Clinton was more negative than positive, she was still overwhelmingly described as the leading 
candidate in the race, or as the “likely” candidate according to Robinson and Sheehan. This, 
combined with Sanders receiving vastly less media attention, means that the positive coverage 
of Sanders did not reach as many people as the Vermont senator needed. After all, it is a good 
thing to receive positive news coverage, but if it reaches relatively few people it’s not going to 
have a big effect. 
 This is not to say that the overwhelmingly negative media attention Clinton received 
did not hurt her. Patterson gave the clearest summary of the effects of the media on Clinton 
during the invisible primary: “Clinton entered 2015 as the presumptive Democratic nominee. 
She was still the presumptive nominee at the end of 2015, though a weakened one as she headed 
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into the Iowa caucuses.”136 But since name recognition is the most important aspect of the media 
during this part of the nomination race, despite being thrashed by the media Clinton was still 
the presumptive nominee; as a result, it can be stated that she won this part of the invisible 
primary as well. 
 
3.4 The black vote already decided 
 
As shown in chapter 2, black democrats are the most coveted group of Democratic voters. 
Sanders not winning over this group was one of the explanations the media gave for his loss. 
Reasons the media gave for Sanders losing the black vote were that Sanders remained an 
unknown figure within the black community (see chapter 3.3), and that his policies did not line 
up with those of the black Democrats. Yet, the analyzed articles did not fully explain where 
these differences in policy preferences come from. An article of New York Times reporter 
Michael Lind gives a good example of the limited context the three newspapers gave in their 
reporting on the primaries. In his article titled “Trumpism and Clintonism Are the Future,” he 
explains why Hillary Clinton’s policies are a better fit with black Democrats than Bernie 
Sanders’s policies. Apart from being one of the only articles, during the primaries, that offered 
some form of context for Sanders’s struggles to fit in with the party, it leaves the reader with 
some questions. 
In his article, Lind explains how the voting bloc of the Democratic Party has changed 
since her husband, Bill Clinton, won the presidency in the 90s. This coalition of Democratic 
voters consists of “(…) an alliance of Northern, Midwestern and West Coast whites from the 
old Rockefeller Republican tradition with blacks and Latinos."137 Lind continues by stating that 
voting blocs of both the Democratic and Republican parties were broken up around the 1970s. 
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Lind also makes the rightful comment that Clinton adjusted her policies to the party’s existing 
base. However, Lind does not mention that the Democratic Party had been the party of the 
minorities since the 1950s and 1960s or under what circumstances the voting blocs were broken 
up.138 This chapter will answer these questions. 
The Democratic Party became the party of minorities amid a push for equality with the 
Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. All of these events had their impacts on the 
Democratic Party itself and would eventually make it the party that sought-after equality and 
economic justice. During the 1950s and 1960s the Democratic Party became the “Party of the 
People.” The fight for civil rights had its origin in the 1940s and in these and the following 
years the Civil Rights Movement would make a name for itself. The Democratic Party would 
become the main supporter of civil rights. As a result of the Civil Rights Movement, under the 
political leadership of President John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson, the 
Democratic Party shed its Southern segregationist and discriminatory past as it became the 
defender of racial justice.139  
However, at the end of Kennedy’s presidency, discrimination and segregation were still 
major problems in U.S. society. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, would continue on 
the road paved by his predecessor.140 During this period, the Democratic Party would also 
become the party for all minorities and women, but especially that of African-Americans, 
something that is still the case today. As David Leege states, during this time “Blacks became 
and remained Democrats.”141 
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This brings us to the 1970s as Michael Lind’s article shows how the change of the 
Democratic voting blocs now picks ups again. Lind explains how, during this time, the 
Republicans started leaning on business and a limited-government perspective while the 
Democrats fought for social equality.142 But Lind does not explain where these changes came 
from. According to Thomas Borstelmann, these changes came in a U.S. society that followed 
two currents. The first current was the push for a free market and the second current was a 
growing social equality.143 It may seem odd to have growing economic inequality and rising 
social equality but, as Borstelmann explained, it is actually quite logical. The link between the 
free-market ideal and the social inclusion was that free markets provided benefits for both 
buyers and sellers. As Borstelmann states, “The green of currency was the only color that 
mattered.”144  
These social and economic changes also had their impact on both parties’ voting blocs. 
The Democratic Party’s focus on broad inclusiveness, gay rights, women’s equality, civil rights, 
and environmentalism meant that voters who thought equality was most important (minority 
voters ranking high in this category) chose the Democratic Party.145 The Republican Party 
followed the current of the free market and voters who favored this and cared less about equality 
would turn to the Republican Party. 146  
 In the 1990s, the Democratic Party once again strengthened its ties with the black 
community through the presidency of Bill Clinton. American novelist and Nobel Prize winner 
Toni Morrison, in 1998, even stated that Bill Clinton was the first black president: “(…) white 
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skin notwithstanding, this [Bill Clinton] is our first black President.”147 Morrison came to this 
conclusion because, according to her, Clinton’s life resembled the life of black Americans at 
that time: “After all, Clinton displays almost every trope of blackness: single-parent household, 
born poor, working-class, saxophone-playing, McDonald’s-and-junk-food-loving boy from 
Arkansas.”148 What Morrison meant by this was that Clinton, like many blacks, started life from 
a disadvantaged position working against him. This was further made clear during the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal where Morrison stated that Clinton was being treated as a black America on 
the street: “The always and already guilty ‘perp’ (…).”149 Aside from Clinton’s life resembling 
that of black Americans, the 42nd president reached out to black Americans throughout his 
presidency. What also helped his popularity was that Clinton’s presidency was a time during 
which the median income in black American households grew 25% and black unemployment 
plummeted.150 This led many black Americans to identify with President Clinton and, as 
research by Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders shows, more black Americans identified 
with the party in the 1990s than in the 1980s, a time when the Democratic Party was trying to 
reinvent itself.151  
  The election of Democrat Barack Obama as president in 2008 meant that black 
Americans still remained loyal to the Democratic Party. President Obama’s role explains why 
black Americans remained loyal to the Democratic Party but there is also another explanation 
for this. Theodore R. Johnson of The Washington Post researched where this loyalty comes 
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from. As Johnson states, in 2012, 45% percent of African-Americans identified as liberal and 
47% identified as conservative, while 93% of African-Americans voted for Obama, who ran 
for the more liberal Democratic Party.152 Johnson has two explanations for this trend. First, 
Johnson states that “(…) Black voters use the group’s well-being as a proxy for their own 
interests; the ‘black utility heuristic’.”153 Second, Johnson states that black voters prioritize civil 
rights issues over anything else. According to Johnson, most black voters see a Democratic vote 
as the same as supporting civil rights and a Republican vote as a vote against their group’s well-
being. Even though the respondents did not say themselves that party affiliation was the most 
important part of their choice on who to vote, the data shows that this is the case.154 
Now, as has been shown, the Democratic Party was the choice for black Americans 
from the 1950s on and remained so. As Lind and this in-depth analysis point out, the black 
community in America puts more emphasis on social and racial issues. Sanders’s campaign did 
not focus on these aspects as his most prominent messages dealt with the economy and political 
corruption. Clinton, however, perfectly put into place a campaign strategy that lined up with 
the history of the Democratic Party and the wants and needs of the black Democrats. This is 
precisely why Sanders did not win the black vote. Hillary Clinton altered her strategy to the 
way the Democratic Party and its voting blocs developed over the years. Clinton, thus, used the 
invisible primary to develop a strategy that would win over black voters, whereas Sanders did 
not. 
The key difference between Lind’s analysis and this one is that the two key questions 
that remained after analyzing Lind’s article, how the Democratic voting blocs changed and why 
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the minority group puts so much emphasis on social and racial issues, has now been answered. 
The effects of “horse race” reporting are hereby shown. 
 
3.5 Why the invisible primary remained invisible 
 
Two things have become clear in the analysis of chapter four: first, the invisible primary is a 
highly important factor in winning the nomination and second, Clinton won every single facet 
of the invisible primary. The fact that the invisible primary plays such a big role makes it strange 
that none of the analyzed newspapers mentioned this as an explanation for Sanders’s loss. 
 The closest the newspapers did come to explaining the impact of the invisible primary 
was writing about how endorsements could have an impact on the race and how Clinton 
gathered a lot more money than Sanders. A February 1st, 2016, article titled “Sanders vs. The 
Machine” written by the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal is an example of this. In this 
article, the authors wrote how Clinton had the backing of the Democratic Party’s establishment 
consisting of lobbies and unions. However, this article is nothing more than an early prediction 
as the authors stated that “This machine is all coming together in Iowa to knock Mr. Sanders 
out in the first round.”155 Nowhere in the articles commenting on the 2016 primaries and 
caucuses is there a mention of the impact of this on the results of the caucuses and primaries. 
Why is this? 
 A possible explanation for this is that, because the media is solely focused on the “horse 
race” during the primaries and caucuses, it only looks at and has time for the present and not 
the past. Since actual votes can now be counted and the public is more interested in the race, 
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the media is much more concerned about what candidates are doing at this that time to win 
votes. Additionally, since most of the articles analyze a certain primary, the specific reasons for 
Sanders’ loss, such as his inability to win the minority vote, received a lot more attention as the 
effects of this are measurable and more clearly visible. This also partly explains why Michael 
Lind’s article did not have the depth it needed to explain why Clinton won the black vote before 
the race began as this did not fit into the “horse race” framework. 
 Nevertheless, it remains noticeable how none of the articles on Sanders’s campaign 
mentioned the impact of the invisible primary. Some articles do mention Clinton’s broad 
support among the party elites but frame it in such a way that it looks as though she received 
this support only during the actual race and not beforehand. The conclusion that can be drawn 
is that, before the primaries and caucuses began, it was already decided who would win. It was 
as though Seabiscuit got a ten-second head start on the rest of the field and, in that case, nobody 
can catch up.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
This thesis sought to research how different American newspapers explained Bernie Sanders’s 
loss during the 2016 presidential primaries. The statement this thesis defended was that 
conservative and liberal media focus on different explanations for Sanders’s loss and that 
through the style of media reporting several important factors in Sanders’s primary defeat, such 
as the invisible primary, were not sufficiently explained. 
 Chapter one gave an overview of media reporting during the primaries and showed how 
the media used the framework of the “horse race” when reporting on the primaries and caucuses. 
This framework presents the campaign as a race where descriptions of candidates were based 
on their position in the race and the contestants were constantly compared to each other. The 
consequence of this was that the attention shifted away from in-depth discussions on political 
issues and the candidates themselves became the focus of the stories. Additionally, chapter one 
also showed how Sanders received drastically less media attention during both the invisible and 
the real primary in 2016. Sanders did, however, receive the most positive media coverage of all 
the candidates, both Democratic and Republican. Unfortunately for Sanders, the positive media 
attention he did get did not focus on his issues or policies. No candidate received less coverage 
on their policies and issues than Sanders. 
 In chapter two, the focus shifted to the real analysis of the three U.S. newspapers: The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal. The papers were analyzed 
from the February 1, 2016, through the August 1, 2016. The analysis showed that there were 
eight explanations given by the newspapers for Sanders’s loss: Sanders’s inability to win the 
minority vote, Sanders’s policies, Sanders’s poor campaign planning, Sanders’s troubles within 
the party, Sanders not being able to defeat Trump in the final election, Sanders’s inability to 
win over women, Sanders’s lack of experience, and finally the older Democrats voting 
overwhelmingly for Clinton. The media often mentioned Clinton’s firewall of minority voters, 
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older democrats and women as the main reason for her victory of Sanders. However, the 
newspapers presented the minority vote as the most import factor in Clinton’s victory. 
Conversely, the category of party troubles received the most mentions. This category 
consisted of the role the Democratic National Convention played, the influence of closed 
primaries and the influence of superdelegates. These three factors were placed in one category 
as they all had to do with the party working against Sanders’s bid for the presidency. The role 
of the Democratic National Convention stands out as this received the most mentions from the 
newspapers and because it was a highly controversial topic since this institution clearly favored 
Clinton and actively worked against the Sanders campaign. However, the role of the 
Democratic National Convention has less merit as an explanation for Sanders’s loss since it 
remains speculative how much impact this had on the Sanders campaign. The newspapers also 
presented it as having less of an impact on the race for the nomination. More research should 
be done to discover just how much of an impact the Democratic National Convention had on 
the Sanders campaign. 
 The remaining explanations for Sanders’s loss received significantly less mentions by 
the newspapers. All newspapers showed the same general trend in explaining his loss. The only 
noticeable difference is to be found in the policy explanation. The New York Times gave twice 
as many mentions of this as the other newspapers did and The Wall Street Journal made more 
mentions of the impact of superdelegates. Additionally, The Wall Street Journal gave more 
attention to the role superdelegates played. However, all three newspapers showed the same 
general trend in explaining the loss of Bernie Sanders. 
 The conclusion of the first part of the proposed thesis statement can, thus, be answered 
by stating that there we no real significant different in the way the more conservative Wall 
Street Journal, the middle-of-the-road Washington Post and the more liberal New York Times 
explained Bernie Sanders’s loss in the 2016 presidential primary. 
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 In chapter three, the importance of the invisible primary was shown. First, it was shown 
that the invisible primary, over the years, had grown more important than the theory of creating 
momentum. The momentum theory stated that, momentum created by good showings in the 
Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary would propel candidates towards the nomination 
because a good early showing would give a boost in positive media, general media attention 
and money. However, during the 2000s this changed. This was because campaigns had 
increased dramatically in costs, and primaries and caucuses were held earlier and closer together 
which meant that candidates had to have more money sooner. 
 Having proven that the invisible primary is an important aspect of the campaign, my 
analysis showed that Clinton won all facets of this part of the campaign. She beat Sanders in 
endorsements, fundraising, media attention, poll standings and managed to use the development 
of the Democratic Party as a way to win the coveted black vote. The chapter also showed that, 
because Clinton won this important part of the campaign so overwhelmingly, it must have 
impacted the campaign. This makes it strange that the analyzed media outlets did not present 
this as an explanation for Sanders’s loss. A possible explanation for this is that the media is 
fixated on the framework of the “horse race” and that it only focuses on what candidates are 
doing during the actual caucuses and primaries to win votes. Additionally, the focus was on 
factors such as poll standings as this was a measurable factor whereas the impact of the invisible 
primary was not. 
 This thesis has shown how The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall 
Street Journal explained the loss of Bernie Sanders during the 2016 presidential primaries. 
There were no real differences in the explanations given by the three different newspapers. In 
addition, it was shown that, because of the media’s fixation on the candidates in the “horse 
race” framework, the media did not mention important parts of explanations and the importance 
of the invisible primary. In the future, more research has to be done to find why the media did 
 68 
not involve the invisible primary in their explanations of Sanders’s loss and what the 
consequences of “horse race” reporting are for the public. Some studies on this have already 
been done, but what is still missing in these studies is whether the role of the invisible primary 
has been marginalized in the reporting of other elections because it does not fit within the “horse 
race” framework. 
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